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INTRODUCTION 
“The patent bargain is the foundation upon which the patent system is built: 
in exchange for protections for an invention, the inventor agrees to make public 
their inventions so that others may build upon it.”1  The patent bargain creates 
a presumption of protection for the inventors, yet categorizing the patent a 
public right or a private right has diminished expectations for inventors and 
confusion for the masses.  On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court denied two 
petitions for writ of certiorari that challenged the constitutionality of Patent 
Trial and Review Board proceedings on the basis of the patent owner’s Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial and Article III separation of powers.2  The latter 
of those cases is the cornerstone for which this comment rests. In Cooper v. 
Lee,3 Petitioner J. Carl Cooper asked the United States Supreme Court to review 
a section of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act that established “inter partes 
review,” (IPR) a procedure for administrative review of a patent.4  Making a 
number of constitutional challenges, Cooper asserts that inter partes review 
empowers an executive agency tribunal to assert judicial power cancelling a 
private property right.5  Moreover, Cooper stresses that patent disputes among 
private parties are disputes that have been known in the common law courts of 
1789, afforded a trial, and cannot be adjudicated by an advisory opinion.6  After 
a tumultuous trip through the legal system in an attempt to finally determine 
the constitutionality of the IPR system, the high court has again left us 
pondering the issue of patent adjudication. With its denial of the petitioner’s 
writ for certiorari, the Court has again refused to declare whether patent rights 
are a private or public right. What does this mean for patent owners going 
forward? The waters are murky, but we will continue to see the adjudication of 
patent disputes by a non-Article III tribunal. 
This Comment examines a key question for patent administrative law: 
whether the grant of a patent is a public right, (i.e. a right that is primarily a 
concern of the public and can only be conferred by the government) thus subject 
to revocation by an administrative agency? In analyzing this concern, this 
 
1.  Editorial. The patent bargain. NATURE (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.nature.com/news/the-
patent-bargain-1.14333 [https://perma.cc/UTQ3-4DVD]. 
2.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 15-
1330, 2016 WL 1729988 (Apr. 29, 2016), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1724103 (Oct. 11, 2016) (arguing 
cancellation of patent claims violated Seventh Amendment right to jury trial); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, Cooper v. Lee, No. 15-955, 2016 WL 355184 (Jan. 21, 2016), cert. denied, 2016 WL 
361681 (Oct. 11, 2016) (arguing violation of Separation of Powers). 
3.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cooper v. Lee, supra note 2.  
4.  Id.  
5.  Id.  
6.  Id.  
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Comment will address three subjects. First, this Comment will explore how 
section 311 of the Patent Act7 established the process of inter-partes 
proceedings and section 3218 established the post-grant review of patents.  
Second, this Comment will outline the case law challenging the 
constitutionality of section 311 and section 321.9  Third, this Comment will 
examine the competing perspectives of whether a patent is a public or private 
right.  This Comment has important implications for whether section 311 and 
section 321 are constitutional exercises of congressional power. Finally, this 
Comment will attempt to foreshadow how the outcome of current case law will 
affect the patent bargain and adjudication scheme. 
I. INTER PARTES AND POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS: NEW ADMINISTRATIVE 
INNOVATION IN PATENT LAW 
Examination remains the crucial element of the quid pro quo patent 
bargain.10  The federal government’s patent power stems from a specific 
constitutional provision, which authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the 
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to 
authors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and 
[d]iscoveries.”11  This clause provides inventors who obtain patents a great deal 
of power, while simultaneously creating limitations to those who are denied 
patentability.12  As a member of the patent board for several years, Thomas 
Jefferson recognized the difficulty in “drawing a line between the things which 
are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those of 
which are not.”13  “Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion 
to monopolies” and his theory of patent ownerships was based on the economic 
concerns of promoting technological advances rather than protecting inventors’ 
moral rights to their discoveries.14  The inherent problems of the patent bargain 
inspired the development of statutory provisions that would weed out 
inventions that were not worthy of the exclusive right of patentability, while 
outweighing the restrictive effect of the patent monopoly.15  As such, any 
inventor who wishes to obtain a patent on a particular invention or claimed form 
of art must first file an application with the United States Patent and Trademark 
 
7.  35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012), amended by Pub. L. 112-274, §1(d)(2) (2013). 
8.  Id. 
9.  See supra note 2.  
10.  See generally Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
11.  U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
12.  Graham, 383 U.S. at 4–5. 
13.  Id. at 9.  
14.  Id. at 7–9. 
15.  Id. at 10–11. 
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Office (USPTO), that contains a specific oath by the applicant that they are the 
true creator of the invention at bar.16  A USPTO examiner will then review the 
application and determine whether the claims present in the application are 
patentable.17  If the applicant meets the statutory requirements, the USPTO will 
issue a patent to the inventor.18  However, controversy arises to the question of 
whether a patent can be reviewed after issuance of a decision by the USPTO.19  
Administrative review of the issuance of patents can be separated by two 
significant time periods: The Patent Act of 1952, and the America Invents Act 
of 2011 (AIA).20  The two periods are commonly known as Pre-AIA and Post-
AIA. 
A.  Pre-AIA: Administrative Review under the Patent Act of 1952 
Before 1980, a party could only challenge the validity of an issued patent 
through the courts in jury trials.21  In 1980, Congress enacted the first statute 
which allowed for an administrative alternative to federal court litigation for 
patent issuance disputes known as “ex parte reexamination.”22  Section 302 of 
the Patent Act authorized an ex parte reexamination in which a patent owner or 
third party could request that the USPTO reexamine that patentability of an 
issued patent.23  Upon granting a petition for ex parte review, the USPTO would 
reexamine the question of patentability and issue a final office action that could 
lead to reexamination of an issued patent.24  Ex parte reexamination was limited 
as only the patent owner could seek administrative appellate review of any 
rejection by the USPTO.25  In a review of this procedure, Congress determined 
that ex parte reexamination was inadequate because it failed to allow third party 
requestors to participate in the review process.26 
Beyond its practical infirmities, Section 302 of the Patent Act of 1952 was 
 
16.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a), 115 (2012).  
17.  Id. 
18.  Id.  
19.  See generally Robert P. Greenspoon, SCOTUS asked to consider constitutional 
challenges to post grant proceedings, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2016/01/21/scotus-asked-consider-constitutional-challenge-post-grant-patent-proceedings/id=65129/.  
20.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
21.  See Patlex v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
22.  See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
ch. 30).  
23.  See 35 U.S.C. § 302; see also Syntex (USA), Inc. v. USPTO, 882 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (outlining the basic contours of the ex parte reexamination statute that gave third-party 
requestors no right to participate in the reexamination process).  
24.  35 U.S.C. § 305. 
25.  15 U.S.C. § 306(b) (2012). 
26.  Patlex, 758 F.2d at 601.  
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also challenged on constitutional grounds. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) considered whether the ex parte 
reexamination procedure was constitutional in two key cases: Patlex v. 
Mossinghoff and Joy Technologies, Inc. v. ManBeck.27  First, in Patlex, a 1985 
case, the Federal Circuit examined how vested property or other interests are 
protected by the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, or Article III, 
against the retrospective effect of patent reexamination. “If so, did the 
provisions of Public Law 96–517 or any of its implementing regulations effect 
a deprivation of protected interests?”28  Under 35 U.S.C. § 261, which provides 
that “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of 
personal property,”29 appellants argued that the section must be interpreted to 
mean that the inventor’s bundle of rights following the issuance of a patent are 
protected with the same constitutional muster as tangible property rights.30  “It 
is beyond reasonable debate that patents are property.”31  As such, the appellant 
asserted that he “has been deprived of the right to have validity determined by 
a jury and an Article III court, both of which rights are founded in the 
Constitution.”32  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by the appellants’ 
arguments and upheld the constitutionality of ex parte reexamination by the 
USPTO.33  Specifically, the Federal Circuit did not read McCormick 
Harvesting as forbidding Congress from authorizing reexamination to correct 
governmental mistakes, even against the will of the patent owner.34  Even so, 
the court again failed to determine the extent of Congress’s reexamination 
authority and how that impacts the protections afforded to inventors. So, 
litigation continued. 
In Joy Technologies, Inc. v. ManBeck, the Federal Circuit once again 
considered whether or not ex parte reexamination proceedings violate the 
Seventh Amendment or Article III of the Constitution.35  The petitioner in Joy 
requested that the court of appeals “review the district court’s conclusion that 
 
27.  See generally Patlex, 758 F.2d 594; Joy Techs., Inc. v. ManBeck, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 
1992).  
28.  Patlex, 758 F.2d at 598–599; see In Consol. Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) 
(“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same 
foundation and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”). 
29.  35 U.S.C. § 261. 
30.  Patlex, 758 F.2d at 600. 
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. at 603. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. at 604 (holding “[v]alidity often is brought into question in disputes between private 
parties, but the threshold question usually is whether the PTO, under the authority assigned to it by 
Congress, properly granted the patent.”). 
35.  See Joy Techs., 959 F.2d at 226. 
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the reexamination statute does not unconstitutionally deprive a patentee of a 
jury trial and the court’s imposition of costs against Joy pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 145.”36  Joy further questioned the vitality of the Patlex ruling.37  Rejecting 
the petitioner’s arguments and relying heavily on the ruling in Patlex, the court 
of appeals held that that the ex parte reexamination proceedings do not violate 
the Seventh Amendment or Article III of the Constitution.38  “Together, Patlex 
and Joy settled the question of whether the PTO can adjudicate the validity of 
issued patents for a generation.”39  Yet, thirty years later, the Court has been 
asked again to consider whether administrative tribunals reviewing the validity 
of issued patents violates the patentee’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial.  And again, they have failed to provide insight. 
B. Post-AIA Administrative Review – Inter Partes Review  
and Post-Grant Review 
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.40  The Act 
asserted the USPTO’s administrative authority which had been limited under 
the 1952 Act.  These limitations were a result of the Federal Circuit assuming 
exclusive responsibility for making substantive interpretations of the Patent Act 
and “historically cho[osing] not to defer to agencies on the issues of patent 
law.”41  However, the USPTO pushed back; this push for agency rulemaking 
authority played a fundamental role in the reforms of the AIA.42 One 
commenter refers to the historical shift in substantive rulemaking authority as 
the “power struggle” between the Federal Circuit and the USPTO.43  Pre-AIA, 
the substantive restrictions on the USPTO’s rulemaking authority stemmed 
from the courts’ patriarchal mentality.  Yet, ultimately the USPTO won the 
struggle for rule-making authority with the enactment of the AIA.44  The AIA 
not only addressed the rulemaking authority of the agencies, but also addressed 
the fundamental deficiencies in the patent system, the delays in the review 
 
36.  Id. at 227. 
37. “Joy contends that ‘[t]he Seventh Amendment analysis requirements established in 
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg and Tull v. United States raise serious doubt about the present vitality of 
Patlex.’” Id. at 228 (citations omitted).  
38.  Id. at 228–229.  
39.  Daniel C. Cooley, J. Derek McCorquindale & Jason L. Romrell, The Constitutional 
Argument Against Agency Adjudication: Can the PTAB invalidate an issued Patent? 89 Pat. 
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 2203, at 1305 (March 13, 2015). 
40.  H.R. REP. No. 1249 (2011).  
41.  Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1550 (2011).  
42.  Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH 609, 616–17 (2012). 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id.  
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process and the inconsistent quality of patents issued.45  Prior to its enactment, 
the culmination of frustrations with the patent system under the 1954 act 
prompted two professors to assert in 2009 that “[t]he patent system is in 
crisis.”46 
In an attempt to correct the crisis, the AIA contained a slew of reforms, 
most significantly diverting patent validity into an administrative agency 
tribunal after the issuance of the patent.47  After establishing the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (PTAB), Congress further expanded the tools for reviewing 
validity with the establishment of inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant 
proceedings.48  Now, an individual or entity may only petition for inter partes 
review under section 311.49  By giving the USPTO and the PTAB broad control 
over their new “trial like” proceedings, Congress shifted the substantive rule-
making authority to the agency and away from the courts.50  As can be expected, 
this shift and the subsequent regulations led to even more confusion over the 
scope of patent protection and extent of federal authority. 
First, the creation of a post-grant review provides the USPTO the 
opportunity to set substantive patent law standards and make patent policy 
through its trial-like proceedings.51  Codified under 35 U.S.C. § 321, post-grant 
review proceedings are conducted by the newly established PTAB, and the 
USPTO proceedings are most likely to invalidate a patent.52  Still, post-grant 
review allows an inventor or third party to challenge the validity of a patent to 
an administrative board instead of a court.53  In Sarah Tran’s Patent Powers 
article, Tran implies that the availability of post-grant proceedings may provide 
a benefit to those that cannot pay the high price of patent litigation, like small 
businesses and other parties with limited financial resources.54  However, the 
PTAB’s broad discretion and the other policy factors that it considers in its 
decision creates a standard that directly impact whether parties can retain their 
fundamental patent rights. 
 
45.  Id. at 627. 
46.  DAN L. BURKE & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 22–29 (2009). 
47.  James E. Daily and F. Scott Kieff, Benefits of Patent Jury Trials for Commercializing 
Innovations, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 878–79 (2014) (“One reason for this is that larger firms 
generally are thought to be more effective at bringing political influence to bear in agency 
determination.”). 
48.  See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29 (2012).  
49.  See id. § 311(b). 
50.  Tran, supra note 42, at 631. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 631–32. 
53.  Id. at 632. 
54.  Id.  
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The second tool given to the PTAB in regulating patent validity is the inter 
partes review codified under 35 U.S.C. § 326(b).  After the PTAB conducts its 
inter partes review,  the PTAB decides whether to institute inter partes 
proceeding that is final and non-appealable.55  During the inter partes 
proceeding, the patent owner and challenger is entitled to take depositions to 
assist the PTAB in conducting its review.56  The inter partes review 
proceedings, including the PTAB’s final written determination regarding the 
validity of the challenged patent claims, must be completed within one year of 
the commencement of proceedings.57  After completing the inter partes review 
proceedings, as a final measure, Congress provides for appellate review in the 
Federal Circuit.58 
Although not the focus of this comment, the difference between the inter 
partes review scheme and post grant proceedings is an important distinction.  
Specifically, the standard necessary to institute an inter partes review rests on 
a showing that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail 
with respect to at least one of the claims challenged.”59  Whereas, the 
prerequisite to institute a post-grant review requires “more likely than not that 
at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable,”60 or that 
“the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other 
patents or patent applications.”61  Although the parties participating in the inter 
partes review have less flexibility than if they acted fast enough to avail 
themselves of post grant review, both of these standards afford the USPTO 
extremely broad statutory authority over standards that immensely impact the 
patent rights of inventors, and alter historical patent policy.62  It seems that 
between the Patent Act of 1952, and the American Invents Act of 2011, patent 
rights have decreased for inventors and the barriers to agency adjudication have 
increased.  Although the intention of the AIA was to make the patent process 
quicker and less costly for inventors, in reality, it has diminished the ability of 
small businesses to challenge invalidity and it has opened a Pandora’s box of 
further litigation brought by inventors who demand patent rights under the same 
standard as private rights for land.  Moreover, it has denounced the adjudication 
 
55.  35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012); Versata Dev. Corp. v. Rea, 959 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920 (E.D. Va. 
2013).  
56.  35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5). 
57.  Id. § 316(a)(11). 
58.  Parties who are dissatisfied with the final written decision of the PTAB may appeal the 
decisions.  Id. § 319 (2012).  
59.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
at 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). 
60.  35 U.S.C. § 324(a)). 
61.  Id.  
62.  Tran, supra note 42, at 635. 
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under the same standards as public rights. Recently, these constitutional 
challenges have recently been highlighted in several recent petitions to the 
Supreme Court. The petitioners beg the Supreme Court to clarify the answer 
the age-old question on our minds: is a patent right a private right or a public 
right? 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW:  
COOPER V. LEE AND MCM PORTFOLIO LLC V. HEWLETT-PACKARD CO. 
The arguments rejected in Patlex and Joy resurfaced in recent litigation 
involving constitutional challenges to administrative review in the form of post 
grant and inter partes under the AIA.  Confusion over the Supreme Court’s 
Article III “public right” jurisprudence has reached its apex in two cases 
pending on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.  The first, Cooper v. Lee,63 
raises constitutional challenges to the new post-grant proceedings available to 
PTAB under the AIA.64  The second, MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co.,65 similarly raises the constitutional challenge to the inter partes review 
under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.66  The constitutional challenges 
to the new IPR and post-grant proceedings are not new to the Supreme Court.  
Although the AIA initiated these proceedings in 2011, the real threshold issue, 
which has plagued patent adjudication since the beginning of time, is whether 
patent rights are a private or a public right, and once determined, what agencies 
have the power to grant or deny a patent to an inventor.  And, although the 
Supreme Court has declined to take on either of these cases, the two cases 
provide pivotal insight to the regulatory patent scheme.  More importantly, 
these two cases illustrate the confusion in how the Supreme Court’s long-
standing precedent related to agency actions will affect patents for both 
invention and land.67 
A. Cooper v. Lee 
Recently, the petition for writ of certiorari in Cooper was denied by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.68  There, the petitioner, J. Carl Cooper, 
questioned whether 35 U.S.C. § 318(b) violates Article III of the United States 
Constitution.  Inter partes review proceeding established under that section of 
the AIA grants broad authority to an executive agency tribunal to assert judicial 
 
63.  See Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal transferred (Oct. 2, 2015), 
aff’d (Jan. 14, 2016). 
64.  See 35 U.S.C. § 318. 
65.  See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
66.  Id. at 1285. 
67.  See, e.g., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman-Miller Co., 169 U.S. 606 (1898). 
68.  See Cooper, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 480. 
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power to cancel private property rights amongst private parties.69  J. Carl 
Cooper’s argument rests on the sentiment that patent rights have always been 
considered private rights and have been embroiled in a private federal dispute 
of a type known in the common law courts of 1789, rather than merely issue an 
advisory opinion as an adjunct to a trial court.70 
The relevant procedural background in the case is as follows.  J. Carl 
Cooper is an inventor and owner of numerous patents.71  Cooper granted 
eCharge Licensing, LLC an exclusive license to a number of his patents.72  
eCharge sought a jury’s determination of infringement, validity, and damages 
as to the three patents.73  In response, the defendant in that action petitioned the 
PTAB to conduct an inter partes review of Mr. Cooper’s patents Nos. 
6,764,005; 7,828,207; and 8,490,875.74  On May 15, 2014, the PTAB initiated 
inter partes reviews of Cooper’s three patents.75  Rather than awaiting the 
decision of the Board, Cooper filed a civil action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, arguing that the inter partes review 
proceedings are unconstitutional on several grounds.76  Moving for summary 
judgment, Cooper relied on United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.,77 
quoting the proposition that “[t]he power . . . to issue a patent for an invention, 
and the authority to issue such an instrument for a grant of land, emanate from 
the same source, and although exercised by differed bureau or officers under 
the government, are of the same nature, character, and validity.”78  This 
sentiment framed the theory for which Cooper proceeded—that patent rights 
are private rights and thus, cannot be adjudicated by legislative courts and 
administrative bodies without violating constitutional protections.79  
Accordingly, Cooper makes the argument that “colloquially speaking, it has 
never been the case that the PTO can rightfully ‘bring a patent into this world,’ 
 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 481. 
71.  Id.  
72.  Id.  Petitioner J. Carl Cooper is an individual and owner of the relevant United Sates 
patents, Petitioner eCharge LLC is an Illinois entity that helps inventors effectively license their 
intellectual property. 
73.  Id. at 481. 
74.  eCharge Licensing LLC v. Square, Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-06445 (N.D. Ill. 2015).  
75.  See id.  
76.  Dennis Crouch, Constitutional Challenges to IPR Continue, PATENTLYO (July 3, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/constitutional-challenges-continue.html [https://perma.cc/L778-
UBSA]. 
77.  United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888). 
78.  See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Cooper v. 
Lee, No. 1:14-cv-00672 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2014) (Dkt. No. 4) (quoting Am. Bell, 128 U.S. at 358–59). 
79.  Id.  
03 BAYNARD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  11:13 AM 
2017] PRIVATE OR PUBLIC RIGHT? 67 
 
and then later ‘take it out.’”80  The district court denied Cooper’s motion finding 
that Cooper’s claims fail relying on the statutory scheme for administrative 
review established in Patlex and Joy.81  The district court also denied Cooper’s 
motion on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction as Cooper had not exhausted 
the administrative process before raising an external constitutional challenge.82  
Specifically, Congress intended the exhaustion doctrine to apply to inter partes 
review because 
(1) the express language of the AIA; (2) the procedures for inter partes 
review proceedings defined by Congress and the statutory scheme for 
administrative and judicial review of said proceedings; and (3) the AIA 
expressly permitting judicial review of the PTAB’s decisions only once 
the PTAB’s ‘final written decision’ has issued.83 
Cooper appealed the lower court’s decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.84  After briefing, the Fourth Circuit transferred 
the case to the Federal Circuit. Subsequently, the Federal Circuit stayed the 
appeal pending the outcome of MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 
B.  HP Decision from Federal Circuit 
The companion case to Cooper, MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., again raises important questions regarding the constitutionality of PTAB 
proceedings under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.  In this case, MCM 
is the owner of U.S. patent No. 7,162,549 (549 patent), which claims methods 
and systems for coupling computer systems with a flash memory storage 
system.85  Hewlett-Packard Co. (HP) filed a petition with the USPTO 
requesting inter partes review of the several claims of the 549 patent under 
Section 311 asserting that the claims were obvious.86  In response, MCM argued 
that inter partes proceedings should have never been conducted because it was 
barred for privacy reasons under section 315(b).87  The PTAB determined that 
HP’s petition demonstrated a “reasonable likelihood” that the challenged 
 
80.  Id.  
81.  Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 483 (E.D. Va. 2015)  
82.  Id. See Cooper v. Lee, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19419, Case No. 1:14-cv-00672-GBL-JFA, 
(E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2015). 
83.  Cooper, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 480, 485; See 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012). 
84.  Id. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Cooper, No. 15-955.  
85.  MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
86.  Id. at 1287.  
87.  Id.  See also 35 U.S.C. §315(b). 
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claims in the 549 patent were invalid as to obviousness.88  After a trial, the 
PTAB issued a final written decision that the challenged claims would have 
been obvious because HP showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
claims were obvious, and in doing so, the PTAB rejected MCM’s argument that 
IPR review violated Article III and MCM’s Seventh Amendment rights.89  On 
appeal, MCM challenged the institution of IPR on two constitutional grounds.  
First, MCM argued that inter partes review is unconstitutional because any 
action revoking a patent must be tried in an Article III court with the protections 
of the Seventh Amendment.90  Second, MCM argues as well that it has a right 
to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment, which is not satisfied by the 
system of inter partes review.  The Seventh Amendment provides that, “[i]n 
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”91  However, mirroring the 
decision in Cooper,92 the appellate court rejected MCM’s claims “[b]ecause 
patent rights are public rights, and their validity susceptible to review by an 
administrative agency, the Seventh Amendment poses no barrier to agency 
adjudication without a jury.”93  Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
MCM was contrary to Cooper’s wishes and the court upheld the 
constitutionality of the IPR proceeding.94 
Still, believing that his case was an ideal and necessary vehicle for 
clarifying Article III jurisprudence, and fixing the damage to the patent system, 
Cooper petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to clarify the issue of the 
constitutionality of IPR.95  However, the Court failed to accept and, in doing 
so, failed to resolve the issue of whether patent protections are private or 
publicly held rights. 
Where do the Federal Circuit decisions leave inventors?  As one commenter 
notes, “the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that a patent is a pubic right rather than 
a private right is at a minimum questionable.”96  Although the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari to these two cases, the petitioners raise pertinent issues 
regarding the current state of the patent scheme.  Accordingly, the next section 
 
88.  MCM Portfolio LLC, 812 F.3d at 1287. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 1288.  
91.  Id. at 1292; U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
92.  Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 483 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
93.  MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,, 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
94.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Cooper, No. 15-955. 
95.  Id. at 36. 
96.  Charles R. Macedo, David Goldberg & Robert J. Rando, NYIPLA Urges SCOTUS to 
Clarify Constitutionality of PTAB Proceedings in MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
IPWATCHDOG (June 1, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/01/nyipla-urges-scotus-
constitutionality-ptab/id=69641/. 
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of this comment will discuss the petitioner’s arguments in Cooper and MCM. 
This Comment will focus on Cooper’s argument that IPR violates the Seventh 
Amendment because it contradicts the long-standing precedent holding that 
patents are property rights and thus, afforded adjudication by a jury. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTER PARTES REVIEW  
UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
This section directly addresses the key question raised in both Cooper and 
MCM.  Because a patent is private right rather than a public right, do inter 
partes and post grant proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial?  This section first examines a patent as a private right is a property 
claim that cannot be revoked without a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment.  This next section examines the second claim, that a patent is a 
public right, and therefore, can be revoked based upon an administrative 
adjudication. 
A.  Claim 1: A patent is a private right 
The district court’s decision in Cooper and the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in MCM, holding that patent rights are public rights, was unprecedented and 
completely contradicted the long recognition of the Court’s constitutional 
protections of patents as private rights, which reaches back to the early 
American Republic.97  This claim is crucial in the analysis. First, Cooper 
claimed that patents rights are private property rights, and therefore can only 
be remedied by actions in a jury trial.98  Thus, allowing inter partes review as 
a form of patent adjudication is in direct conflict with this right to a jury trial.  
This was echoed in the MCM Portfolio case, where the petitioner argued that 
“[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”99 
1. Judges, Juries and the Seventh Amendment Rights of Inventors 
The U.S. patent system has long depended on the decisions of lay judges 
and juries in the adjudications of patent disputes.100  The AIA’s creation of inter 
partes review consequently abolished the patent jury trials, and put the 
adjudication process in the hands of an administrative agency.  Cooper makes 
 
97.  See Brief of Professor Adam Mossoff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Cooper 
v. Lee, No. 15-955, 2016 WL 825985 (Feb. 29, 2016).  
98.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 12, Cooper v. Lee, No. 15-955, 2016 WL 355184 
(Jan. 21, 2016).  
99.   MCM Portfolio LLC, 812 F.3d at 1292 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII).   
100.  Daily & Kieff, supra note 47, at 865 (discussing the criticisms and benefits of adjudicating 
patent disputes by patent juries). 
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the argument that the patentee is deprived of the right of a jury trial because 
inter partes review involves the adjudication of patent validity without 
affording them a jury trial.101  However, critics of the patent jury trials allege 
that trials are extraordinarily expensive and result in inaccurate determinations 
because lay judges and juries lack expertise in the area.102  In deciding whether 
a right to a jury trial exists in a particular patent case, courts look to whether it 
more closely resembles an action at law, or action of equity.103  Patent 
infringement suit have a long history in the common law, and thus, that of a 
jury trial.104  The Court has adjudicated Patent Rights, and explained that 
[a]lthough the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right to jury 
trial as it existed in 1791, the Seventh Amendment also applies to 
actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to 
common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts 
in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts 
of equity or admiralty.105 
Thus, as the petitioners in MCM Portfolio urged, the determination of 
whether a right is a private right afforded adjudication by a jury trial requires 
that courts, “[f]irst compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought 
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.  
Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or 
equitable in nature.”106  MCM argues that under this test, IPR indeed violate the 
Seventh Amendment, because patents on inventions are descendants of a body 
of law that requires factual determinations in order to determine validity.107 
As the MCM petition states, the post grant proceedings conducted by the 
PTAB are in reality a trial.108  Once the proceedings are initiated, the PTAB 
 
101.  Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 481 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
102.  Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek inside the 
Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 256–57 (2001) (arguing that the technical nature of patent cases 
make lay juries unsuitable fact finders). 
103.  In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
104.  See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996) (“Equally 
familiar is the descent of today’s patent infringement action from the infringement actions tried at law 
in the 18th century, and there is not dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as 
their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.”). 
105.  Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1989) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 
U.S. 189, 193 (1974)). 
106.  Tull, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (citations omitted). 
107.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
108.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 
15-1330, 2016 WL 1729988 (Apr. 29, 2016).   
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conducts an adversarial trial before a panel of the same administrative judges 
who made the decision to initiate the proceedings.109  Further, the parties in a 
PTAB proceeding take discovery and then present their arguments and relevant 
evidence, but instead of doing so to a judge or jury, they present to the PTAB.110  
To succeed, the petitioner must only prove invalidity by a preponderance of 
evidence, as the PTAB is the sole decision-making authority,111 and the final 
determination is non-appealable.112 However, even though the PTAB 
proceedings hold the exact same effect and pose the same procedure to 
patentees, it provides none of the traditional rights to litigants.113  According to 
a study in the University of Chicago Law Review, the PTAB has invalidated at 
least one “claim”—or part—in almost 80% of the patents.114  As such, private 
patent rights are denied at a much higher rate, leading some commenters to use 
the term “patent death squad” when referring to the PTAB.115 
The MCM petition stated the issue most clearly, citing to Supreme Court 
precedent that “[t]he only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul 
it, or to correct it for any reason whatsoever, is vested in the courts of the United 
States, and not the department which issued the patent.”116  Further, Adam 
Mosshoff argued in his amicus brief that “[t]his Court unequivocally defined 
patents as property rights in the early American Republic.”117  As evidence of 
this assertion, Mosshoff quoted a unanimous Supreme Court opinion written by 
Justice Joseph Story stating, “that the patent secures to an inventor . . . a 
property in his inventions; a property which is of very great value, and of which 
the law intended to give him absolute enjoyment and possession.”118  It seems 
 
109.  Id. at 4.  
110.  Id. at 5. 
111.  Id.  
112.  See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). Section 314(d) provides that “[t]he determination . . . 
whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and non-appealable.”  
113.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996). 
114.  Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers. 
81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014). 
115.  Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW 360 
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-not-totally-off-
base-chief-says [https://perma.cc/7W7B-92AQ]. 
116.  McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman-Miller Co., 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898).; see 
also Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 364. (Holding that the power to annul or correct a patent “is vested 
in the judicial department of the government, and this can only be effected by proper proceedings taken 
in the courts of the United States.”). 
117.  McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609 (1898). 
118.  Brief of Professor Adam Mossoff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 
97, at 4 (quoting Ex Parte Wood, 22 (9. Wheat) 603, 608 (1824); See also Hayden v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 
11 F. Cas. 900, 901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 6,261) (instructing jury that a patent right, gentlemen, 
is a right given to a man by a law where he has a valid patent, and, as a legal right, is just as scared as 
any right of property.).  
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that the Supreme Court and legal scholars have agreed that patent rights are 
property rights afforded to private citizens, so where does the conflict arise? 
B.  Claim 2: A patent right is a public right. 
It is also easy to see the other side of the argument, which stresses that 
allowing patent jury trials pre-AIA clogged the court with litigation, and put 
information in front of a lay jury that may have a hard time digesting it.119  As 
the Court in Patlex and Joy concluded, patent rights are public rights and 
subject to regulation by the government.  Further, just as the district court in 
Cooper and the appellate court in MCM decided, Congress has long provided 
administrative mechanisms for regulation of the patent scheme.120  The patent 
bargain also plays a big role in the respondent’s argument. The respondent rests 
its case on the fundamental purpose of patent law. The basic aim of patent law 
is to balance the interest of investors on one hand and the interest of the public 
on the other.121  Thus, to incentivize inventors, the patent system must reward 
them for novel works of original art, and not create an unduly burdensome 
process of examining and reexamining claims. 
This Court previously addressed the idea of patents as a public right.122  In 
doing so, it determined that “what makes a right public rather than private rests 
on whether that right is related to a ‘particular federal action.”123  Moreover, the 
respondent suggests that the petitioners, specifically Adam Mossoff’s amici 
curiae, ignores the Supreme Court’s modern holdings and rely on dated case 
law, many of which comes from the nineteenth century.124  Also, the respondent 
claims that the petitioner’s argument lacks merit because the cases they rely on 
involve patents for land and were all decided on statutory rather than 
constitutional grounds.125  This is the respondent’s strongest argument against 
the unconstitutionality of the IPR proceedings.  As such, it could be inferred 
that the history of patent law transformed to fit the needs of society. The Patent 
Act of 1952 provides support for that idea. Under the Patent Act of 1952, 
Congress provided for administrative mechanisms for third parties seeking 
 
119.  William Rose, Calming Unsettled Waters: A Proposal for Navigating the Tenuous Power 
Divide Between the Federal Courts and the USPTO Under the American Invents Act, 22 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 613, 632–37 (2013). 
120.  Brief for the Respondent in Opposition of Writ of Certiorari, Cooper v. Lee, Cooper v. 
Lee, No.15-955, 2016 WL 1426908. 
121.  Purpose of Patent Law, RENTSCH PARTNER, http://www.rentschpartner.ch/en/patent-
law/overview-on-patent-law-in-switzerland/purpose-of-patent-law [https://perma.cc/7YQZ-ZHCQ] 
(last visited Jan. 20 2017).  
122.  See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–85 (2011).  
123.  See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).  
124.  Brief for Respondent in Opposition of Writ of Certiorari, supra note 120, at 14. 
125.  Id.  
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reconsideration, and in doing so created ex parte reexamination.126  This statute 
broadened the USPTO’s power over the ability to cancel or at least halt 
patentability.127  Again, in 1999, Congress expanded the powers of the USPTO 
to review and determine the patentability of claims in issued patents by creating 
the inter partes review process.128  Finally, in 2011, under the AIA, Congress 
expanded the powers of the USPTO to establish their own board of adjudicating 
authority.  This is said to be a response to “a growing sense that questionable 
patents are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge.”129 
The petitioners in Cooper and MCM maintained to the Supreme Court that 
their cases were an ideal vehicle for clarifying Article III jurisprudence and 
fixing constitutional damage to the patent system.  However, in opposition to 
the sentiment that the PTAB violated Seventh Amendment protections, it is a 
commonly held and economically practical idea that patent trials are costly and 
produced inaccurate decisions.  This idea is reflected in the statement during a 
judicial panel discussion on the topic of science and the law, “[h]onest to God, 
I don’t see how you could try patent matter to a jury. Goodness, I’ve gotten 
involved in a few of these things. It’s like somebody hit you between your eyes 
with a four-by-four. It’s factually so complicated.”130  Ultimately, the Court was 
unpersuaded. The Supreme Court declined the petitions, and, in doing so, failed 
to clarify whether patent rights are property rights or public rights, and further 
clarify the PTAB’s carte blanche authority over inventors.  Failure to take up 
the issues has created a contradiction in nexus between patent law and 
constitutional law.  Where do inventors go from here? And, will the Supreme 
Court’s failure to clarify the issues stop subsequent litigation? The latter is 
unlikely. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
There are several avenues the patent scheme may proceed.  First, the Court 
could and will likely experience more litigation regarding the adjudication of 
patent rights. Accordingly, the Court could determine that patent rights are 
private rights and thus afforded adjudication by trial with a jury.  However, this 
may not fix the problems of the patent regulatory scheme.  Second, the Court 
could decide that patent rights are public rights, and that Congress’s grant of 
broad authority to the PTAB is not a constitutional violation.  However, this 
 
126.  Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 483 (E.D. Va. 2015).  
127.  Id.  
128.  Brief for the Respondent in Opposition of Writ of Certiorari, supra note 120, at 2.  
129.  H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39 (2011). 
130.  Symposium, Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 
1144 (1993). 
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will stop the challenges from petitioners like Cooper or MCM Portfolio, nor 
does it clear up historical precedent and statutory transitions. 
Patent academic Ray Mercado filed an amicus brief, in a final effort to 
persuade the Court that patents should be seen as “private rights,” not a public 
utility that can merely be administratively cancelled.  He writes, “[o]nce the 
historical uniqueness of patent law is taken into account, it is clear that patents 
are ‘private rights’ for purposes of this Court’s separation of powers 
jurisprudence, and their validity must be decided by Article III courts.”131 
The best practice would be for the Court to clarify whether a patent right is 
a public or private right and to make sure all lower courts are on the same page.  
This would include possibly holding a judicial council on the issue at bar, and 
potentially reworking the patent system to allow for more adjudicating options 
for those inventors who wish to make their case to a jury.  Moreover, it seems 
from the previous amendments that the legislature is unsure how to responds to 
issue arising under the patent scheme.  It seems that some patents should be 
able to go forward with the PTAB proceedings and some should be afforded 
Seventh Amendment protections.  But these proceedings require factual 
determination, and a patent jury, in some instances, could be pooled by 
screening individuals with a background in patent law and/or inventors in the 
field.  Congress should also provide an avenue for appeal from the PTAB’s 
final written decision without facing dismissal under the administrative 
exhaustion doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
According to a White House press release, the AIA “represents the most 
significant reform of the Patent Act since 1952,” and inter partes review and 
post-grant proceedings are key sections of the Act.132  However, there are clear 
issues with the proceedings, and ignoring these issues by denying certiorari will 
not make them go away.  The Supreme Court must clarify the issues plaguing 
the patent system and causing discomfort for inventors who want their piece of 
the patent bargain.  “The very fact that the lower court believed itself to be 
faithfully applying this Court’s latest ‘public rights’ pronouncements indicates 
how deeply this area of law is in disrepair and how desperately necessary 
 
131.  Dennis Crouch, One Last Try: Is the Inter Partes Review System Unconstitutional, 
PATENTLYO (Oct. 19, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/10/review-system-unconstitutional.
html [https://perma.cc/FP6G-7GSU]. 
132.  See The White House, Press Release, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, 
Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help 
Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16
/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.  
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Supreme Court elucidation is on this important issue.”133  The broad lesson to 
be drawn from this comment is that no legislation is cost-free.  Although the 
benefits of inter partes review may seem high because the proceedings are 
conducted by the PTAB, a body that is skilled in the patent and invention 
process, it is also important to weigh those benefits against their true cost.134  
As the use of inter partes review in post-grant proceedings is becoming a 
common process for establishing validity of patent claims, patentees are 
employing a large range of legal arguments against the PTAB’s authority to 
invalidate their patents.  However, these arguments are made without solid 
solutions to the problem.  Even if the PTAB’s authority to invalidate patents is 
ultimately affirmed, future appeals are likely to raise new constitutional 
arguments, such as Fifth Amendment due process concerns.135 The 
dissatisfaction with the PTAB’s most decisions most invalidating patents has 
placed the issue of constitutionality directly in the cross hairs of the Federal 
Circuit.  Absent clarification on this issue, almost nothing remains of the high 
walls this courts has occasionally had to invoke to prevent Congressional 
encroachment on the judicial branch. 
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133.  Greenspoon, supra note 19.  
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